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Abstract 
 
Today in the British electricity industry, most electricity suppliers hedge a large 
proportion of their residential customer base requirements by owning their own plant.  
The non-storability of electricity and the corresponding need for an instantaneous 
matching of generation and consumption creates a business need for integration.  From 
a sample of half-hour data on load factor for coal-fired power plants in England and 
Wales, this paper tests the hypothesis that vertical integration with retail businesses 
affects the extent to which producers utilize their capacity.  We also pay attention to this 
potential effect during periods of peak demand.   
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Does vertical integration have an effect on load factor? – A test on coal-fired plants in England and Wales 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Today, most electricity retailers hedge their supply by owning their own plant.  Thus 
most electricity retailers face a trade-off between the cost of dealing with market 
uncertainty and the cost of managing production units.  The non-storability of electricity 
and the corresponding need for an instantaneous matching of generation and 
consumption creates a need for integration (Kahn, 2002: 46).  A supplier that owns 
physical production capacity can bypass the volatile and often illiquid electricity 
exchanges in order to hedge its customer base.  Unlike Industrial & Commercial 
customers, who often are offered contracts indexed to electricity exchange related 
prices, residential customers are charged (for the time being) with prices that do not 
reflect real-time conditions. 1  
 
Electricity is a basic good thus nearly all electricity customers must be given some 
assurance against energy shortages and rationing.  As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph electricity retailers supply electricity to domestic customers at prices that are 
not forcibly linked to real-time wholesale prices.  Like for any non-storable good, 
retailers must respond to uncertain demand in the short term by sourcing from capacity 
that is inflexible in the short-term. 2  The fact that in the short-term to mid-term the 
electricity supply curve is inelastic can thus lead to significant wholesale price spikes. 3  
Note that in general off-peak, prices yield insufficient income to pure generators, which 
implies that peak profit maximisation strategies may seek to balance off-peak losses 
(Fitoussi, 2003: 43)   
 
The California experience has made it clear that market system design can have 
negative consequences for consumers and other stakeholders in the well functioning of 
                                                 
1 Furthermore there are logistical constraints on the number of times per year that a large supplier can 
adjust its prices, on top of regulated notice periods of notice (currently 28 days in the British electricity 
market). 
2 Maintenance, repairs, equipment failures of power plants and primary input price fluctuation (coal in 
coal-fired plants, etc.) add to this uncertainty. 
3 In fact some economists have asked themselves the question, why spikes are not observed more 
frequently and with more intensity, probably the result of some sort of self-restraint. 
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the physical electricity system.  Agents in the electricity sector are dependent on each 
other since failures in any part of the system can affect other firms’ costs in the short 
term 4 (Delmas and Tokat, 2003: 8).  These constraints are compounded by the fact that 
in the short term residential demand is not contingent on prices, particularly because of 
the political and logistic difficulty of confronting them with the wide fluctuation in 
marginal supply costs on a real-time basis (see Kahn, 2000: 46).  
 
The industry structure of the mid-merit coal-fired generation sector in the UK is the 
result of several mandatory and voluntary plant divestments and subsequent re-
concentration.  Before 1990 each regional supplier (ex-Regional Electricity Company) 
was vertically integrated with a distribution network, whilst National Power and 
Powergen owned most of the thermal generation assets (78%). 5  Plant divestments 
along with new entry took place, thus reducing both National Power and Powergen’s 
share of generation capacity and fragmenting the electricity generation industry.  
 
Though some market power remains under the New Electricity Trading Arrangement 
(NETA) (Bower, 2002: 11-12), estimates suggest the “pivotal player strategy” is less 
often used in the wholesale energy market in England and Wales as a result of the 
increasing fragmentation of capacity ownership (Frontier Economics, 2003). 6  Plant 
divestment was accompanied with a rapid move to vertical integration (VI) of 
generation businesses with supply businesses (once initial regulatory barriers had been 
lifted).  Today’s present market structure is marked by the dominance of the residential 
supply market by six large vertically integrated firms (albeit the degree of vertical 
integration varies amongst them, there is a tendency to converge upon a similar business 
model).   
 
Vertically integrated retailers are less exposed to price volatility as they can internally 
adjust production (supply) to their load (demand) requirements (Delmas and Tokat, 
2003: 9) at a lower cost than the one they might face in the wholesale markets.  This 
                                                 
4 Notably the failure of ENRON and other energy traders subsequently increased the amounts of collateral 
requested by most electricity traders from remaining counter parties to cover credit-risk. 
5 Whilst nuclear remained in the hands of British Energy and BNFL. 
6 The exercise of market power as a result of capacity withholding by multi-plant producers seems to have 
been more extreme in California than elsewhere (Kahn, 2002: 47). 
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efficiency may be passed on to customers.  Among other authors Kahn (2002: 49) 
believes that continued ownership of generation by suppliers in California would have 
protected them but they accepted the obligation to freeze their retail rates and 
subsequently found themselves in great financial penuries as wholesale prices spiked 
persistently.   
 
By monitoring the performance of their generators, integrated retailers can improve 
supply reliability and accordingly earn returns from alleviating moral hazard problems.  
It is thus expected that VI is related to the extent to which producers utilize their 
available capacity, especially in periods of peak demand.  Whilst, at the same time VI 
may raise policy concerns as it increases market concentration and may reinforce the 
dominant position of an incumbent. 
 
The main question raised in this project is whether VI plays a significant role in 
explaining the distribution of load factor (LF).  LF can be defined as the ratio of the 
output produced by a plant in a certain period and the theoretical maximum that it could 
have produced.  If LFs were higher for vertically integrated firms, more particularly, 
during peak times then we could conclude that VI has a role to play in limiting gaming 
in the wholesale electricity production market.  Obviously LFs may be influenced by 
several other determinants such as seasonality, plant vintage, and plant scale.  We 
essentially address these issues from a multivariate statistical approach applied to data 
on ten coal-fired power plants in England & Wales in a typical day.  
 
The plan is as follows.  In section 2 we suggest a few rationales underlying VI of 
generators with retail businesses.  It is also suggested that the incentive to merge is 
higher for electricity retailers than for producers who still may have an incentive to 
“game” the market.  Section 3 explores the distribution of LFs in more detail and sets up 
a multivariate model to test whether it is influenced by VI, particularly during peak 
times.  We are also enable to measure the marginal effect on LFs of the size of plants, 
which indirectly gives precious information about the technology that relates supply to 
owned capacity.  Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Vertical integration as a natural structure in an industry subject 
to particularities 
 
2.1 Fragmentation of coal-fired electricity generation capacity 
 
The coal-fired generation duopoly of National Power and Powergen was able to 
exercise a considerable amount of market power in the Pool, especially after March 
1993 when the vesting coal contracts expired.  As privatisation began, reduction in 
industry concentration in the generation sector was effective in reducing market power 
thus lowering prices (Green, 2004; Bower, 2002).  Specifically by the time the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) were implemented, the coal-fired generation 
sector had become fragmented amongst over eight firms.  Overall capacity 
concentration fell by 3856 points over the period April 1990-March 2002 as measured 
by the HHI index (Bower, 2002: 30).   
 
In July 1998 Powergen was allowed to vertically reintegrate its generation business with 
the supply business of East Midlands Electricity in return for further divestment.  
Similarly National Power bought the retail business of Midlands Electricity Board in 
June 1999. 7  In a subsequent voluntary round of divestment, Powergen divested plant 
to British Energy and London Electricity (today EDF Energy) before in turn being itself 
taken over by E.ON in July 2002.  National Power reduced its coal-fired capacity too 
and was later taken over by RWE in May 2002.  New entrants invested in combined 
cycle gas turbines (CCGT) plant that initially enjoyed a cost advantage due to coal 
vesting contracts and low wholesale gas prices.   
 
2.2 Drivers behind vertical integration 
 
Retailers face uncertainty about the cost of sourcing the electricity they are to supply to 
their customer base.  This economic uncertainty is a source of market transaction costs 
(Spulber, 1999: 236-).  Following the transaction costs literature, VI may be 
                                                 
7 Powergen sold Fiddlers Ferry (1960 MW) and Ferrybridge (1956MW) to Edision Mission energy whilst 
National Power sold Drax (3870MW) to AES. 
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economically founded as it is sometimes cost effective to internalize some transactions, 
organising and coordinating them within a hierarchical firm (Grossman, 2003: 23).  
According to Bower (2002), the NETA gave large consumers and suppliers an incentive 
to undertake active load and price risk management.  Consequently they can alleviate 
the costs of dealing with market uncertainty (the amounts of electricity they purchase) 
(Spulber, 1999: 270) through VI and control over generation, which may increase 
reliability of input supplies.  8  
 
2.2.1 Hedging customers 
 
Residential end-customers do not contract directly with generators.  The social cost of a 
decentralised matching market would be certainly higher than transacting with 
electricity retailers.  Basically these latter act as market makers (they interface end-
customers and producers who ship electricity via the grid and distribution networks).  It 
is worth noting that long term contracts may decrease the transaction cost gains from 
VI.  Although long term contracts have the virtue they can reduce wholesale electricity 
prices (Green, 2003), vertically integrated retailers can handle information asymmetries 
more effectively in the short term.  Also long-term contracts present risks for the retailer 
(counter party credit risk, lack of flexibility, amongst others). 
 
In the E&W market coal plant sometimes runs during periods of high demand.  During 
peak demand, opportunistic gaming behaviour can be more profitable for independent 
generators and the importance of appropriately hedging domestic customers becomes 
even bigger.  VI may alleviate opportunistic behaviour (plant capacity withdrawal) by 
otherwise pivotal generators and thus increase LF.  The most obvious reason is that 
being a retailer may give producers, particularly pivotal generators, an incentive to 
increase supply as they have contractual obligations vis-à-vis their customers at a fixed 
price.  These generators could otherwise have benefited from withholding capacity 
(López, 2002; Bower, 2002).  Finally since generators learn about the amount of their 
resource stock one period before the market clears, retailers may seek to acquire more 
                                                 
8 Kahn (2002: 46) emphasizes the high degree of interdependence between investments and operation at 
the transmission and generation levels presumably taken into account internally by the several vertically 
integrated franchised monopolists that used to dominate the US electric industry.  VI provides incentives 
for undertaking investments at one horizontal level necessary for the success of operations at another. 
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than one generation units, thereby eliminating uncertainty about the total amount of 
available supply. 9
 
2.2.2 Ensuring plant dispatch during peak demand periods 
 
In general power plants find it profitable to produce electricity during peak time when 
whole sale prices are higher than average.  By calling their peaking plant, there is 
certainly a trade off between withholding capacity until price reaches a certain level and 
producing hence making money now (Green, 2004).  Today capacity withholding is 
however less often observed as stated in section 2.1.  VI may thus allow generators to 
dispatch their peak-load plants with lower coordination costs.  This assertion will be 
tested econometrically. 
 
The existence of a link between LF and VI would thus be informative about the extent 
to which producers may be attempting to “game” the market (by withholding load at 
peak demand periods for example).  A positive relationship between VI and LF would 
suggest that vertically integrated producers seek rents in a less opportunistic way than 
independent producers. 
 
3 Does vertical integration have an effect on load factor? 
 
3.1 Technical definition of load factor 
 
Traditionally LF is a measure linked to a theoretical maximum output capacity measure 
and it can be defined as the ratio of the output produced by a plant in a certain period 
and the theoretical maximum that it could have produced.  Thus a yearly LF would 
equal the total output of a plant in a year divided by the maximum possible output of 
that plant also in a year.  LFs can be measured in hours, days, weeks, or whatever other 
time period one deems appropriate.   
 
                                                 
9 Demand seasonality gives an incentive to acquire generation plants of different capacity to operate near 
full capacity for a greater amount of time thus reducing average costs.  It is worth noting that a retailer 
holding all installed capacity in the sector would still face uncertain demand. 
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It is different from the availability factor (AF) that is the ratio of gross electric output 
over a given period of time to the amount of electricity that could be produced if the 
plant were operating at capacity for the entire time, excluding scheduled downtime 
periods. 10  AF gives higher values than LF when used to assess the performance of any 
particular plant (Virdis and Rieber, 1991).  LF is a key indicator as it is the relevant 
concept for generation costs estimates.  The higher the LF the lower the generation cost 
per kWh, as the greater total fixed costs of plant are distributed over a larger power 
output.  This negative relation exists in a stronger form for nuclear plants.  In the late 
80s, a LF for U.S. coal plants could be estimated at above 60%. 
 
Finally, the level of LF might be driven by technical efficiency in that firms that use 
lower amounts of capacity for a given amount of supply are thus more efficient.  Given 
VI is often a rationale for being more efficient throughout larger scales of production, 
thus supporting the potential link between VI and the level of LF.  A network with a 
high LF may be more cost-efficient otherwise, a low LF would suggest that the same 
level of supply could be obtained with less installed capacity.  It is generally accepted 
that a firm that can obtain more output without changing the level of inputs is more 
technically efficient (Delmas and Tokat, 2003).  When transposed to our case these 
firms achieve higher economies of scale.  The data of summarised in Table 1 
 
3.2 Distribution of load factor 
 
This study is preliminary as we restrict to coal-fired generation plants and consider a 
typical day (an average of all days throughout the year). 11  The data range from 1st 
January 2003 to 31st December 2003.  LFs are collected for 10 coal-fired power plants 
in E & W.  This latter restriction has the advantage that marginal cost must be similar 
                                                 
10 For nuclear plant, downtime is required for schedules maintenance, or for refuelling once in twelve to 
eighteen months, reducing its output. 
11 As seasonality is not removed we are aware this may create aggregation problems and therefore biased 
estimation.  The rationale is that all generators face the same seasonality of demand.  
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across producers. 12  LF is measured each half hour for 14 coal-fired generation units 
that supply in that day.   
 
We can see in Figure 1 that LF is less dispersed at times when the demand presses on 
capacity that is in the interval 8am–7pm.  In Figure 2 we compute the standard 
deviation of LF across plants over time (the thick line).  Two remarks that concern the 
properties of the data deserve to be mentioned here: 
 
(i)  LF looks clearly non stationary in its first two moments; 
(ii)  the standard deviation seems clearly negatively correlated with the mean.  13   
 
The thin line in Figure 2 represents the mean across plants.     
 
In a preliminary analysis, we look at the unconditional distribution of LF in order to 
find out whether we have two populations with distinct means, one for vertically 
integrated and the other for independent producers (our sample has 50% of each type).  
A preliminary visual analysis shows that load throughout the day follows an asymmetric 
distribution with a mode about 75% of capacity for both types of producers.  As shown 
in Figure 3 the mode corresponds to a higher value for LF in vertically integrated firms.   
 
3.3 Conditional model for load factor 
 
It seems that we actually have two distinct populations according to whether power 
plant is vertically integrated or not.  We build now a conditional model with potential 
determinants that are supposed to explain this difference.  We estimate the following 
conditional linear model for LF:  
 
                                                 
12 For economic reasons, coal-plants are generally used for base-load as well as cycling and peak loads, 
when load following becomes necessary (Virdis and Rieber, 1991).  The reasons are a low capital cost of 
coal plants and a high variable cost of each extra kWh.  This cost is about €35/MWh. 
13 A linear fit of the apparent relationship between the two variables gives a coefficient of determination 
of 0.938.  The corresponding equation is standard deviation = –0,259 × mean + 0,316.  
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μ λ= + +it i t itu     (2) 
 
where t = 1,…,T(≡48) half hours, i = 1,…,N(≡10) denotes the different generation units, 
qit is the supply for plant i during period t, ki is its installed capacity.  LFit≡qit/ki is thus 
the load factor for plant i during period t.  =10*ik
–4ki is introduced as a means to capture 
the effect that larger plants may have on the level of load factor. 14  Its relevance will be 
discussed later.  
In addition to the constant term β0, we have introduced a dummy variable d that equals 
one if i is vertically integrated and 0 otherwise.  Delmas and Tokat (2003) use a 
different proxy for VI.  VI for an electric utility is captured using the proportion of 
electricity sold that is generated by the utility.  Their dependent variable is however 
different than ours; it captures productive efficiency using input and output measures. 15  
v is vintage of plant i; the age of the plant at 2003.  μi accounts for unobservable plant-
specific effect that are not included in the regression, λt is the unobservable time effect 
and vit is the remainder disturbance.   
 
We notice if one estimates the model as a one-way error component one with fixed-
individual effects we cannot estimate a coefficient on any time-invariant regressor 
(Baltagi, 2005: 13).  The Least Squares Dummy estimator measures individual 
observations as deviations from time means.  But given the obvious trend in the variable 
LF in a typical day (see remarks (i)-(ii) at p. 9 and Figure 1) we should prefer a method 
that averages the observations across individuals for each half-hour and therefore ignore 
estimators that average observations over time.  We thus propose to estimate the model 
as a one-way error component with fixed time effects. 16  
 
14 We thank L. Nesta for motivating the insertion of that variable. 
15 They use Data Envelopment Analysis to convert multiple input and output measures into a single ratio 
for US electric utilities (details in Delmas and Tokat, 2003: 13-14).  
16 One may want to estimate the model as a one-way with random-individual or a two-way with fixed-
time and random-individual effects but these would produce the same estimates for the coefficients as but 
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4 Results 
 
Results are given in Table 2.  As expected, the coefficient multiplying the VI variable is 
positive (0.0459) and significantly different from zero (a 95% confidence interval for 
this coefficient is [0.0261, 0.0656]).  Notice that total capacity for vertically integrated 
plants is about 200MW lower than that for independent plants, which could have as 
consequence that producers with less capacity use on average a higher fraction of it 
relative to independent producers ceteris paribus the other factors.  Our model corrects 
for this potential ‘capacity effect’ since we inserted capacity through .  Put other way, 
our result suggests that for similar levels of installed capacity, vertically integrated 
producers use a higher fraction of that capacity than independent producers.  
*
ik
 
The individual effect of capacity is positive.  If we combine this result with the previous 
result, these are clearly an argument in favour of concentration in the hand of 
independent producers as vertically integrated producers can achieve similar levels for 
LF with less capacity.  The negative vintage effect (– 0.0255) may be explained as 
follows: older plants are certainly less cost-efficient and are more likely to be used only 
when demand is the highest while younger plants are used more often base-load.  
Figure 4 supports this result.  It shows the cumulated values of LF for two categories of 
plants, those built in the period 1966-1969 (dashed curve) and those built in the period 
1970-1974 (continuous) curve.  
 
We also ran a test that VI has no effect on the relationship between load factor and peak 
demand against the alternative that either VI alone or the interaction variable or both 
have an effect (see Table 3).  To avoid multicollinearity we estimated (1) including a 
dummy for half hours between 17 and 35 inclusive in addition to an interaction variable 
between this dummy and the VI dummy.  The coefficient on the interaction variable 
will allow us to test whether customers hedging during peak times increases with VI (or 
VI may give producers a further incentive to increase supply, especially during periods 
of peak demand).  The f- statistic equals 2.903, which is lower although close to the 
                                                                                                                                               
higher standard errors.  Moreover, in random-individual models, it is preferable that N be large, a 
condition which our sample does not satisfy. 
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95% critical value F(2,475) of 3.00.  Consequently VI has no effect on the relationship 
between load factor and peak demand.   
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Transaction and contractual theories of the firm as well as the achievement of 
economies of scale provide a rationale for vertical integration of electricity businesses 
with supply businesses.  Today in the British electricity sector, the majority of retailers 
hedge their residential customer base using their own plants.  This preliminary paper 
investigated this potential link between vertical integration and the fraction used of 
available capacity (the load factor) from data on ten coal-fired power plants in England 
and Wales.     
 
As suggested the effect on load factors of vertical integration corrected for both the size 
of plant and its age, is positive and significant.  Vertically integrated producers would 
use an extra 4.6% of their installed capacity.  This effect is however not significant 
when demand presses on capacity that is in the period 8am-7pm.  Interestingly, the 
greater the plant capacity the higher that is the load factor.  This is clearly an argument 
in favour of increasing returns to scale in power plants and possibly concentration more 
particularly for independent producers as our main result shows vertically integrated 
producers use a higher fraction of their capacity.  The reason could be that retailers 
holding a high number of plants are better equipped to dispatch them efficiently to 
hedge their customers.    
 
Regulation authorities would do well in keeping an open mind regarding vertical 
integration, as it may serve to limit the exercise of market power by pivotal generators.  
Although vertically integrated firms may be slow to adapt to changing regulatory 
environments (Delmas and Tokat, 2003).  Indeed, “deintegrated” firms may adapt more 
rapidly as they do not have to coordinate new regulatory information among different 
steps of the value chain.  The idea that firms with high load factors are more technically 
efficient can be mitigated.   
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APPENDIX 1 
TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of coal-fired power plants in 2003 
 
 
Plant Name 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Load factor 
% 
 
Onwer 
 
Vintage 
  Min Max   
 
Independent 
Drax 3870 57 78 Drax Power Ltd 1974 
Rugeley 1006 38 73 International Power 1972 
Ferrybridge C (a) 1955 10 59 AEP 1966 
Fiddler’s Ferry (a) 1961 11 72 AEP 1971 
Eggborough 1960 21 52 British Energy 1967 
Total 10752     
 
Vertically integrated 
Ratcliffe 2000 47 75 E.On UK 1968 
Ironbridge 970 18 51 E.On UK 1970 
Cottam 2008 26 75 EDF Energy 1969 
West Burton 1972 13 64 EDF Energy 1967 
Aberthaw B 1455 43 58 RWE Npower Plc 1971 
Total 8405     
        (a). Includes Biomass.  
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Table 2. Results for the model with fixed-time effects 
 
  
Fixed-time effects 
 
Variables 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Vertical integration 0.0459 *** 0.0101 
Vintage – 0.0255 *** 0.0020 
Capacity 0.6016 *** 0.0674 
Constant 1.0945 *** 0.0816 
2R 0.703 
   *** = “1% significance level” 
 
 
 
 15
José A. LÓPEZ, Evens SALIES 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results from OLS 
 
 Unrestricted Restricted 
 
Variables 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Vertical integration 0.0615 *** 0.0172   
Peak 0.2232 *** 0.0187 0.2034 *** 0.0133 
Vertical integration×Peak – 0.0395 * 0.0264   
Vintage – 0.0255 *** 0.0028 – 0.0243 *** 0.0028 
Capacity 0.6016 *** 0.0916 0.5191 *** 0.0893 
Constant 1.1728 *** 0.1020 1.1754 *** 0.1030 
2R  0.451  0.437 
F-test 79.73 > F0.01(5,474) = 3.05 125.41 > F0.01(3,476) = 3.82 
*** = “1% significance level”, * = “20%”. 
 
 
 16
Does vertical integration have an effect on load factor? – A test on coal-fired plants in England and Wales 
APPENDIX 2 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Load factors 
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Figure 2. Spread of load factors for independent and integrated 
generating plants 
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Figure 3. The frequency distribution of load factors for independent and 
integrated generating plants 
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Figure 4. Cumulated load factor and plant vintage 
 
 
 
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
30,00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47
Half hour
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
l
o
a
d
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
1966-1969 1970-1974
 
 
 
 
 
 20
